The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00054448
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- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1987. "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Working Papers 87-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush & Shlomo Lampert, 1980. "Preference expression and misrepresentation in points voting schemes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 421-436, January.
- Niemi, Richard G., 1985. "Reply to Brams and Fishburn," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 818-819, September.
- Shmuel Nitzan, 1985. "The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 349-370, January.
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
- Niemi, Richard G., 1984. "The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 952-958, December.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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- Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Post-Print hal-03347632, HAL.
- Lehtinen, Aki, 2008. "The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 688-704, September.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2008.
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- Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 617.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
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- Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver & Shin Sato, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Post-Print hal-02517255, HAL.
- Eric Kamwa, 2019.
"Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser,"
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- Eric Kamwa, 2019. "The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Post-Print hal-01786121, HAL.
- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0703, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
- Alcalde-Unzu, J. & Vorsatz, M., 2007. "Size approval voting," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010.
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- Granić, Đura-Georg, 2017. "The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 21-38.
- Alexander Tabarrok & Lee Spector, 1999. "Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 261-288, April.
- Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 1998. "Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence from Seven Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 520-533, April.
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- Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.
- George Tsebelis, 2018. "How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 81-90, June.
- Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
- Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Working Papers halshs-00337290, HAL.
- Donald Saari, 2010. "Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 217-247, February.
- Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 133-147, November.
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