The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser
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- Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021.
"Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention,"
Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 55-73,
Springer.
- Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui & Eric Kamwa, 2021. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Post-Print hal-02196387, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Probability; Condorcet; Extended Impartial Culture; Ranking; Approval Voting;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2019-07-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2019-07-22 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2019-07-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2019-07-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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