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Report NEP-DES-2019-07-22
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Girum Abebe & Marcel Fafchamps & Michael Koelle & Simon Quinn, 2019, "Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 26035, Jul.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019, "All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 966.19, Jun.
- Eric Kamwa, 2019, "The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01786121.
- Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019, "Rent extraction with securities plus cash," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1212.