Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
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- Gehrlein, W. & Valognes, F., 2000. "Condorcet Efficiency: A Preference for Indifference," Papers 224, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
References listed on IDEAS
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives," Working Papers 43, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
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- Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin, 2010. "On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 289-316, August.
- Hervé Crès, 2001. "Aggregation of coarse preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 507-525.
- repec:spr:qualqt:v:51:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s11135-016-0446-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
- Mathieu Martin, 2002. "On the emptiness of the stability set of order d," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 313-326, June.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Working Papers hal-01064879, HAL.
- Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004.
"The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
- Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes, 2004. "The Impact of Indifferent Voters on the Likelihood of some Voting Paradoxes," Post-Print halshs-00069089, HAL.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9388-4 is not listed on IDEAS
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015.
"The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules,"
Group Decision and Negotiation,
Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2014. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Post-Print hal-01450834, HAL.
- Lepelley, Dominique & Martin, Mathieu, 2001. "Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 163-177, March.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," Sciences Po publications 659/1998, Sciences Po.
- Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.
More about this item
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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