Aggregation of coarse preferences
We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement \ell\leqn if it first partitions An into \ell subsets of `tied' alternatives, and then ranks these subsets within a linear ordering. When \ell
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Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 29 June 1999/Accepted: 25 February 2000|
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