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Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

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  • Hervé Crès

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement ≤ n if it first partitions An into subsets of 'tied' alternatives, and then ranks these subsets within a linear ordering. When

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01064879, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01064879
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01064879
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adrian Van Deemen, 1999. "The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(2), pages 171-182.
    2. HervÊ CrÉs & Yves Balasko, 1998. "Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 313-334.
    3. Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
    4. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    5. Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1998. "Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations," Post-Print hal-03567702, HAL.
    6. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
    7. Tovey, Craig A., 1997. "Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-279, August.
    8. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    9. Jones, Bradford & Radcliff, Benjamin & Taber, Charles & Timpone, Richard, 1995. "Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 137-144, March.
    10. Kelly, Jerry S, 1974. "Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(2), pages 239-251, March.
    11. Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1976. "The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 14-25, August.
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