Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem
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- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers hal-01064883, HAL.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Sciences Po publications 706/2000, Sciences Po.
- Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers hal-00598173, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crés, 2005.
"Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 887-906, November.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers hal-00597193, HAL.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers hal-01064884, HAL.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2004. "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Discussion Papers 04-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," HEC Research Papers Series 722, HEC Paris.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Sciences Po publications 722/2001, Sciences Po.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001.
"Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent,"
Sciences Po publications
726/2001, Sciences Po.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," HEC Research Papers Series 726, HEC Paris.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-00597200, HAL.
- Beker, Pablo F., 2007.
"Market Selection And Payout Policy Under Majority Rule,"
Economic Research Papers
269763, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Beker, Pablo F, 2007. "Market Selection and Payout Policy Under Majority Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 814, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Shareholder's vote; general equilibrium; incomplete markets; super majority;JEL classification:
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
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