Production externalities: internalization by voting
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0697-z
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- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Working Papers hal-00972983, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Elena L. Mercato & Vincenzo Platino, 2017.
"On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: competitive equilibrium à la Nash,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(1), pages 287-307, January.
- Elena L. del Mercato & Vincenzo Platino, 2015. "On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: Competitive equilibrium à la Nash," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15044, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Elena L. del Mercato & Vincenzo Platino, 2017. "On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: Competitive equilibrium à la Nash," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01438970, HAL.
- Elena L. del Mercato & Vincenzo Platino, 2016. "On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: Competitive equilibrium à la Nash," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01162039, HAL.
- Elena L. del Mercato & Vincenzo Platino, 2016. "On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: Competitive equilibrium à la Nash," Post-Print halshs-01162039, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
General equilibrium; Majority voting; Production externalities; Shareholder governance versus stakeholder democracy; Social choice; D21; D51; D72; G39; L21;JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
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