Production externalities: internalization by voting
We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 53 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 403-424
| Handle: | RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:2:p:403-424 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
|
| Order Information: | Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Won, Dong Chul & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2008. "Equilibrium theory with unbounded consumption sets and non-ordered preferences: Part I. Non-satiation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1266-1283, December.
- Birgit Grodal & Egbert Dierker, 1999.
"The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm,"
Economic Theory,
Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 257-284.
- Egbert Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1996. "The Price Normalization Problem in Imperfect Competition and the Objective of the Firm," Discussion Papers 96-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Egbert DIERKER & Birgit GRODAL, 1996. "The Price Normalization Problem in Imperfect Competition and the Objective of the Firm," Vienna Economics Papers vie9616, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Egbert Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1998. "The Price Normalization Problem in Imperfect Competition and the objective of the Firm," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
- Shafer, Wayne & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1975.
"Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 345-348, December.
- Wayne Shafer & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1974. "Equilibrium in Abstract Economies Without Ordered Preferences," Discussion Papers 94, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ritzberger, Klaus, 2005. "Shareholder voting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 69-72, January.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2004.
"Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets,"
Discussion Papers
04-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crés, 2005. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 887-906, November.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Les Cahiers de Recherche 722, HEC Paris.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Sciences Po publications 722/2001, Sciences Po.
- Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991.
"Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
- Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 938, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B., 1989. "Aggregation And Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Discussion Papers 1989_31, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978.
"A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies,"
Special Studies Papers
115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
- Camelia Bejan & Florin Bidian, 2012.
"Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies,"
Economic Theory,
Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 571-602, August.
- Bejan, Camelia & Bidian, Florin, 2009. "Ownership Structure and Efficiency in Large Economies," MPRA Paper 17677, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2011. "Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility," Vienna Economics Papers 1106, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
- Romer, Paul M, 1986.
"Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-37, October.
- Paul M Romer, 1999. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2232, David K. Levine.
- Camelia Bejan, 2008. "The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 99-118, October.
- DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
- Hansen, Robert G. & Lott, John R., 1996. "Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(01), pages 43-68, March.
- Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 221-254, February.
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:2:p:403-424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)
or (Christopher F Baum)If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.