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Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Author

Listed:
  • CRES, Herve
  • TVEDE, Mich

    (University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of the shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Les Cahiers de Recherche 722, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0722
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
    2. Shafer, Wayne & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1975. "Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 345-348, December.
    3. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    4. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    5. Ferejohn, John A. & Grether, David M., 1974. "On a class of rational social decision procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 471-482, August.
    6. Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1995. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 95.01, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
    7. Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
    8. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    9. CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Les Cahiers de Recherche 726, HEC Paris.
    10. Steinar Ekern & Robert Wilson, 1974. "On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(1), pages 171-180, Spring.
    11. Itzhak Gilboa & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Majority vote following a debate," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 115-125.
    12. Dreze, Jacques H, 1985. "(Uncertainty and) the Firm in General Equilibrium Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 1-20, Supplemen.
    13. Radner, Roy, 1972. "Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(2), pages 289-303, March.
    14. Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bisin, Alberto; & Gottardi, Piero; & Ruta, Guido, 2014. "Equilibrium corporate finance and intermediation," Economics Working Papers ECO2014/09, European University Institute.
    2. Britz Volker & Herings Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2010. "Theory of the Firm: Bargaining and Competitive Equilibrium," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 212-222, March.
    4. Hnatkovska, Viktoria, 2010. "Home bias and high turnover: Dynamic portfolio choice with incomplete markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 113-128.
    5. Piero Gottardi & Atsushi Kajii & Tomoyuki Nakajima, 2016. "Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 1-28, February.
    6. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 45-75.
    7. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Working Papers hal-00972983, HAL.
    8. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 403-424.
    9. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," Post-Print hal-01022731, HAL.
    10. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "On the Political Economy of Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 05-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Jun 2006.
    11. Tirelli, Mario, 2006. "The evaluation of public investments under uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 188-198.
    12. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 403-424.
    13. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10267 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "On the political economy of adverse selection," Working Papers hal-01065577, HAL.
    15. Guido Ruta & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Equilibrium corporate finance," 2009 Meeting Papers 149, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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