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Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models

Author

Listed:
  • Hervé Crès

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Utku Unver

    (Department of Economics - Tilburg University [Netherlands])

Abstract

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 -- 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2010. "Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01023800, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01023800
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629810371015
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01023800
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 212-222, March.
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    7. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," SciencePo Working papers hal-01022731, HAL.
    8. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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    10. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "Portfolio Diversification and Internalization of Production Externalities through Majority Voting," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01065579, HAL.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ideology; mean voter theorem; spatial voting; super majority;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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