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The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election

Listed author(s):
  • Maria Gallego

    ()

  • Norman Schofield

    ()

  • Kevin McAlister

    ()

  • Jee Jeon

    ()

Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain non-convergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election. That is, the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. An electoral survey of the 2004 election in Canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions: Québec and the rest of Canada. The survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space. The variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share. We find that in the local Nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence, the Liberals and Conservatives, locate at the national electoral mean and the Bloc Québécois, with the highest competence valence, locates at the Québec electoral mean. The New Democratic Party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean. The Greens, with lowest competence valence, locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-013-0109-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 158 (2014)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 427-463

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:3:p:427-463
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0109-3
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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  1. Norman Schofield & Christopher Claassen & Ugur Ozdemir & Alexei Zakharov, 2011. "Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 483-518, April.
  2. Norman Schofield & Alexei Zakharov, 2010. "A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 177-194, January.
  3. Patty, John Wiggs, 2005. "Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 523-536, May.
  4. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
  5. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
  6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:111-130_25 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Norman Schofield, 2006. "Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 183-203, December.
  8. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
  9. Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
  10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:02:p:432-446_16 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. John Roemer, 2011. "A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 383-421, April.
  12. Donald G. Saari, 1997. "The generic existence of a core for q -rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 219-260.
  13. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
  14. Schofield, Normal & Martin, Andrew D. & Quinn, Kevin M. & Whitford, Andrew B., 1998. "Multiparty Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A Model Based on Multinomial Probit," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 257-293, December.
  15. Norman Schofield & Maria Gallego & Ugur Ozdemir & Alexei Zakharov, 2011. "Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 451-482, April.
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