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Modelling Politics

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  • Norman Schofield

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Abstract

Formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the center of the electoral distribution. This paper discusses various political episodes in British and US history to suggest that political divergence is generic. This leads to the inference that political choice involves electoral judgment as well as preference. The stochastic electoral model is extended to incorporate the basis of judgment, namely valence. The model suggests that when the electoral system is based on proportional electoral methods, then there will be numerous parties with very di¤erent valences, adopting very divergent positions. Under plurality rule, on the other hand, the role of activists appears to restrict the number of parties to two, and to cause a slow political rotation in the policy space.

Suggested Citation

  • Norman Schofield, 2007. "Modelling Politics," ICER Working Papers 33-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:icr:wpicer:33-2007
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    File URL: http://www.biblioecon.unito.it/biblioservizi/RePEc/icr/wp2007/ICERwp33-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guido Cataife & Norman Schofield, 2007. "Electoral Oscillations in Argentina.," ICER Working Papers 34-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    2. Norman Schofield, 2007. "Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 461-490, April.
    3. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
    4. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
    5. Schofield, Norman & Cataife, Guido, 2007. "A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 213-231, May.
    6. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
    8. Norman Schofield, 2013. "The “probability of a fit choice”," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(2), pages 129-150, June.
    9. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 359-368.
    10. Norman Schofield & Gary Miller & Andrew Martin, 2003. "Critical Elections and Political Realignments in the USA: 1860-2000," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 51(2), pages 217-240, June.
    11. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    12. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    13. McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-933, July.
    14. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    15. Norman Schofield, 2006. "Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 183-203, December.
    16. McKelvey, Richard D. & Patty, John W., 2006. "A theory of voting in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 155-180, October.
    17. McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman, 1986. "Structural instability of the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 179-198, June.
    18. Schofield, Norman & Sened, Itai, 2005. "Multiparty Competition in Israel, 1988 96," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(04), pages 635-663, October.
    19. Norman Schofield & Micah Levinson, 2007. "Modelling Authoritarian Regimes," ICER Working Papers 32-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    20. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(01), pages 73-88, March.
    21. Schofield, Norman, 1972. "Ethical Decision Rules for Uncertain Voters," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 193-207, April.
    22. repec:cup:apsrev:v:49:y:1955:i:02:p:452-469_06 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Adams, James, 1999. "Multiparty Spatial Competition with Probabilistic Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 259-274, June.
    24. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    25. Norman Schofield, 2005. "The intellectual contribution of Condorcet to the founding of the US Republic 1785–1800," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 303-318, December.
    26. Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
    27. repec:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:02:p:432-446_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    28. repec:cup:apsrev:v:78:y:1984:i:01:p:1-16_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Adams, James, 1999. "Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(1-2), pages 103-122, July.
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