Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
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References listed on IDEAS
- McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-933, July.
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- Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. "Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
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- Norman Schofield & Ugur Ozdemir, 2009. "Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 207-242, October.
- Sebastian Galiani & Norman Schofield & Gustavo Torrens, 2014.
"Factor Endowments, Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(1), pages 119-156, February.
- Sebastian Galiani & Norman Schofield, 2010. "Factor Endowments, Democracy and Trade Policy Divergence," DEGIT Conference Papers c015_027, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2013. "Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 85-102.
- Schofield, Norman & Cataife, Guido, 2007. "A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 213-231, May.
- Köppl-Turyna, Monika, 2014. "Campaign finance regulations and policy convergence: The role of interest groups and valence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 1-19.
- Luca Lambertini, 2007. "Platform stickiness in a spatial voting model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(40), pages 1-11.
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- Bryan McCannon, 2009. "Can the majority lose the election?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 305-317, December.
- Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield & Kevin McAlister & Jee Jeon, 2014. "The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 427-463, March.
- Monika Turyna, 2012. "Estimation of party positions: A comment on Schofield and Zakharov (2010)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 163-169, October.
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- Guido Cataife & Norman Schofield, 2007. "Electoral Oscillations in Argentina.," ICER Working Papers 34-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Benček, David, 2016. "Opportunistic candidates and knowledgeable voters: A recipe for extreme views," Kiel Working Papers 2047, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
More about this item
KeywordsLocal Nash equilibrium; Stochastic electoral model; Valence; Activists; C13; C72; D72;
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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