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Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting

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  • Crès, Hervé
  • Tvede, Mich

Abstract

In absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.

Suggested Citation

  • Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," HEC Research Papers Series 816, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0816
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
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    10. Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
    11. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    12. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2004. "The Drèze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability," Working Papers hal-00591676, HAL.
    13. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
    14. Simon Benninga & Eitan Muller, 1979. "Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 670-682, Autumn.
    15. Louis Gevers, 1974. "Competitive Equilibrium of the Stock Exchange and Pareto Efficiency," International Economic Association Series, in: Jacques H. Drèze (ed.), Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality, chapter 10, pages 167-191, Palgrave Macmillan.
    16. Barlow, Robin, 1970. "Efficiency Aspects of Local School Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1028-1040, Sept.-Oct.
    17. Cass, David & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "The structure of investor preferences and asset returns, and separability in portfolio allocation: A contribution to the pure theory of mutual funds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 122-160, June.
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    3. Hervé Crès & Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and existence of 50% : Majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," SciencePo Working papers hal-01065582, HAL.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepsg269m is not listed on IDEAS
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    6. Azar, José & Schmalz, Martin & Tecu, Isabel, 2017. "Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership," IESE Research Papers D/1169, IESE Business School.
    7. Hervé Crès & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 431-444, October.
    8. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10277 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepsg269m is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Production externalities; majority voting; portfolio diversification; general equilibrium; stakeholder governance; mean voter;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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