Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting
This paper demonstrates the existence of a shareholders' equilibrium for a two-period stock-market economy in which there may be fewer securities than states of the world. There are two allocation mechanisms in the economy: firms' owners may vote (direction restricted majority rule) to change firms' production plans across states while keeping shareholdings fixed, and individuals may trade their shares and stocks of a current production/consumption good while keeping firms' plans fixed. A shareholders' equilibrium is a set of firms' plans, and an allocation of shares and the current good which are stable with respect to both mechanisms. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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