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Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Hervé Crès

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In a simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K S/2. Finally, through parametric examples, these rates are shown to decrease with the homogeneity of the shareholders' beliefs on the probabilities of the states of nature, and to increase with the shareholders' pessimism.

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Crès, 2000. "Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem," Working Papers hal-00598173, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00598173
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    Cited by:

    1. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    2. Beker, Pablo F., "undated". "Market Selection And Payout Policy Under Majority Rule," Economic Research Papers 269763, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10283 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    5. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-01065004, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models

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