A bargaining theory of the firm
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0721-3
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Lachiri, Oussama, 2004.
"On the objective of firms under uncertainty with stock markets,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 493-513, August.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Oussama Lachiri, 2004. "On the objective of firms under uncertainty with stock markets," Post-Print hal-00187217, HAL.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Oussama Lachiri, 2004. "On the objective of firms under uncertainty with stock markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00187217, HAL.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Oussama Lachiri, 2004. "On the objective of firms under uncertainty with stock markets," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04122, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979.
"A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978. "A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies," Special Studies Papers 115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2002.
"Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1245-1251, May.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2000. "Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria when Markets are Incomplete," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2001. "Nonexistence of constrained Efficient Equilibria when Markets are Incomplete," Vienna Economics Papers 0111, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crés, 2005.
"Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 887-906, November.
- Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers hal-00597193, HAL.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers hal-01064884, HAL.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2004. "Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Discussion Papers 04-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- CRES, Herve & TVEDE, Mich, 2001. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," HEC Research Papers Series 722, HEC Paris.
- Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2001. "Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets," Sciences Po publications 722/2001, Sciences Po.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1989. "Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 353-365, December.
- Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 221-254, February.
- Jacques Drèze & Oussama Lachiri & Enrico Minelli, 2009.
"Stock Prices, Anticipations and Investment in General Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
0916, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
- DREZE, Jacques H. & LACHIRI, Oussama & MINELLI, Enrico, 2009. "Stock prices, anticipations and investment in general equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010.
"Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
- Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2008. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric nash bargaining solution," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-1161, July.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2012.
"Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 713-728, November.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2011. "Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility," Vienna Economics Papers 1106, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2007.
"Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 291-305, January.
- Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2006. "Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory," Post-Print halshs-00150523, HAL.
- Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
- Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Zierhut, Michael, 2019. "Nonexistence of constrained efficient production plans," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 127-136.
More about this item
Keywords
Strategic bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; Incomplete markets; Stock market equilibrium; Objective function of the firm; Profit-maximization; C78; D52;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:45-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.