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Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Author

Listed:
  • Mich Tvede
  • Hervé Crès

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at mostpercent of the shareholders. It is shown that a-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists ifwhereSis the number of states at the last date andJis the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller's.

Suggested Citation

  • Mich Tvede & Hervé Crès, 2005. "Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets," Post-Print hal-03598171, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03598171
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0537-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01022731, HAL.
    2. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00972983, HAL.
    3. Alberto Bisin & Gian Luca Clementi & Piero Gottardi, 2014. "Capital Structure and Hedging Demand with Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 20345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2023. "Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1181-1205, May.
    5. Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2010. "Theory of the firm: bargaining and competitive equilibrium," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    6. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "On the political economy of adverse selection," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01065577, HAL.
    7. Guido Ruta & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Equilibrium corporate finance," 2009 Meeting Papers 149, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 45-75, September.
    9. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," SciencePo Working papers hal-00972983, HAL.
    10. Bisin, Alberto; & Gottardi, Piero; & Ruta, Guido, 2014. "Equilibrium corporate finance and intermediation," Economics Working Papers ECO2014/09, European University Institute.
    11. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," SciencePo Working papers hal-01022731, HAL.
    12. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "On the political economy of adverse selection," SciencePo Working papers hal-01065577, HAL.

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