Incomplete Markets and the Firm
In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Dreze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Dreze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto Optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there are economies with a single firm in which no Dreze is constrained pareto efficient. Even a unique Dreze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto efficient.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/
More information through EDIRC