A note on the Drèze’s criterion for large capitalist firms
The paper extends the Drèze's Criterion [Investment under private ownership : optimality, equilibrium and stability, in «Allocation under Uncertainty ; Equilibrium and Optimality», Wiley, New York, 1974, p.129] for firms to non-smooth and non-convex technologies and to non-ordered preferences for the consumers. Technically, the proofs follow the lines of Guesnerie [Pareto Optimality in Non-convex Economies, in Econometrica, 43, p. 1-31, (1975)]. Using recent tools of non-smooth analysis, we exhibit the first-order-necessary conditions for constrained Pareto optimal allocations. The Drèze's criterion for firms is recovered, but the profit maximization is replaced by a first-order- necessary condition for optimality, together with other relations between state prices and consumptions. A new stock-market equilibrium is formalized. We show that stock holders buy nothing but stocks of a firm that maximize his expected profit with respect to his own shadow price.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 01 44 07 81 00
Fax: 01 44 07 81 09
Web page: http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979.
"A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, 1978. "A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies," Special Studies Papers 115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1999.
"Incomplete Markets and the Firm,"
99-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Dierker, E. & Dierker, H. & Grodal, B., 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Papers 9902, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Dierker, E. & Dierker, H. & Grobal, B., 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Papers 99-03, Carleton - School of Public Administration.
- Egbert DIERKER & Hildegard DIERKER & Birgit GRODAL, 1999. "Incomplete Markets and the Firm," Vienna Economics Papers vie9902, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Geanakoplos, J. & Magill, M. & Quinzii, M. & Dreze, J., .
"Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-916, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Geanakoplos, J. & Magill, M. & Quinzii, M. & Dreze, J., 1990. "Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 113-151.
- John Geanakoplos & Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii & J. Dreze, 1988. "Generic Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium When Markets Are Incomplete," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 863, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Cornet, B., 1986. "The second welfare theorem in nonconvex economies," CORE Discussion Papers 1986030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1975. "Pareto Optimality in Non-Convex Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(1), pages 1-29, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.