Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting
A commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France|
Web page: http://www.hec.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yves Balasko, 1988.
"Equivariant General Equilibrium Theory,"
Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva
88.05, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
- Yves Balasko, 1989. "Equivariant General Equilibrium Theory," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 89.08, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
- Cres, Herve, 1996. "Symmetric Smooth Consumption Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 334-366, May.
- Sven Berg, 1985. "Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 377-387, January.
- Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
- Malinvaud, E, 1973. "Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual Risks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 383-410, May.
- Tovey, Craig A., 1997. "Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 271-279, August.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0638. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sandra Dupouy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.