IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qmw/qmwecw/424.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Alliances and Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Manzini

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

  • Marco Mariotti

    (University of Exeter)

Abstract

A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances, and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the composite player affect the bargaining outcome. In particular we find that unanimity procedures lead to `more aggressive' behaviour than majority procedures, and that procedures which introduce minimum safeguards for the members of an alliance may result in agreements that are worse than without those safeguards.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Alliances and Negotiations," Working Papers 424, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:424
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.qmul.ac.uk/sef/media/econ/research/workingpapers/2000/items/wp424.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    3. Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1996. "Multiperson Bargaining over Two Alternatives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 226-244, February.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-851, November.
    6. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
    7. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
    8. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    9. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2002. "The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 490-499, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(2), pages 459-490.
    2. Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg, 2012. ""My friends: it would be an error to accept": Communication and group identity in a bargaining setting," Working Papers 1203, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    3. Elbittar Alexander & Gomberg Andrei & Sour Laura, 2011. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-33, August.
    4. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Elbittar Alexander & Gomberg Andrei & Sour Laura, 2011. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-33, August.
    6. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
    7. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    8. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel de Lara, 2021. "Bargaining On Monotonic Economic Environments," Working Papers hal-03206724, HAL.
    9. Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2015. "Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 399-414, September.
    10. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 8224, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    11. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2009. "Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 195-203, September.
    12. Amin, Gholam R. & Ibn Boamah, Mustapha, 2023. "Modeling business partnerships: A data envelopment analysis approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(1), pages 329-337.
    13. Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2023. "The Politics of Bargaining as a Group," DEM Discussion Paper Series 23-12, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    14. Anesti, Vincent & Buisseret, Peter, 2023. "The Politics of Bargaining as a Group," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 81, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    15. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2001. "Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    16. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Reinterpreting the meaning of breakdown," Game Theory and Information 0501004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Björn Brügemann & Pieter Gautier & Guido Menzio, 2019. "Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(2), pages 564-592.
    5. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2003. "Walrasian bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 465-487, November.
    6. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0305, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    7. Antonio Merlo & Xun Tang, 2010. "Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 11 Mar 2011.
    8. Daniel P. O'Brien, 2014. "The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 92-115, March.
    9. Vicente Calabuig, 1999. "Ineficiencias de las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados: un panorama," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 303-329, September.
    10. May, Frank Christian & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Centralized Bargaining in Press Wholesale," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79984, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022. "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.
    12. Houba, Harold, 2007. "Alternating offers in economic environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 316-324, September.
    13. Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
    14. S. Yu & E. C. Ierland & H.-P. Weikard & X. Zhu, 2017. "Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 709-729, October.
    15. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Bargaining theory without tears," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(3), pages 403-419, September.
    16. Harold Houba, 2005. "Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-063/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2006. "Wage Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1017-1039, December.
    18. Imai, Haruo & Salonen, Hannu, 2000. "The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 349-365, May.
    19. Liang Mao, 2017. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(4), pages 485-500, April.
    20. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Alliances; Multiperson bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nicholas Owen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deqmwuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.