Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
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- Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79967, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Kai A. Konrad & Thomas R. Cusack, 2013. "Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4071, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
bargaining; incomplete information; coalitions; groups; strategic bargaining power;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2013-04-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-04-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-04-13 (Microeconomics)
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