Report NEP-GTH-2013-04-13
This is the archive for NEP-GTH, a report on new working papers in the area of Game Theory. Sylvain Béal (Sylvain Beal) issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-GTH
The following items were announced in this report:
- Item repec:dgr:umagsb:2013014 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2015, "Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 686, Sep.
- Pongou, Roland & Serrano, Roberto, 2013, "Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 46021, Apr.
- Item repec:dgr:uvatin:20130043 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Sela, Aner & Haimanko, Ori & Orzach, Ram & Einy, Ezra, 2013, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 9315, Jan.
- Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2013, "Confirming Information Flows in Networks," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 45835, Apr.
- Item repec:dgr:uvatin:20130051 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2013, "Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 6, Mar.
- Andrea Gallice, 2013, "Equilibrium selection through pu-dominance," Working papers, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, number 019, Mar.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013, "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 9281, Jan.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013, "Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, number SP II 2013-202.
- Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2013, "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent Externalities," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 13-10.
- Guimaraes, Bernardo & Araujo, Luis, 2013, "The effect of options on coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 9294, Jan.
- Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller & Hideo Konishi, 2013, "Household Formation and Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 821, Mar, revised 01 Nov 2016.
- Jinzhong Niu & Simon Parsons, 2013, "Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1304.3135, Feb.
- Schmutzler, Armin & Jönsson, Stefan, 2013, "All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 9323, Jan.
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