Group formation and governance
This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its (endogenously derived) size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than majority, but also a change of status quo.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2008|
|Date of revision:||Nov 2008|
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- Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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