Bargaining, War, and Alliances
As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called â€œbalancingâ€ occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with what is called â€œbandwagoning,â€ but can actually make bandwagoning more likely. Moreover, balancing need not occur for international systems to be stable.
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