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Tullock contest alliances with proportional prize-sharing agreements: private collective action mechanisms?

Author

Listed:
  • James Boudreau

    (Kennesaw State University)

  • Shane Sanders

    (Syracuse University)

Abstract

This paper focuses on humanity’s supposedly irrational behavior in conflict decision-making, challenging two rationalist puzzles in political science and economics: war’s inefficiency and alliance formation. More specifically, we ask whether alliances can benefit the allies. Standard Tullock contest alliances are plagued by free riding, undermining successful collective action. In a three-party contest environment when two of the parties ally, input substitution and fixed prize division hinder collective action. Analyzing the same contest with input-cost complementarity and proportional prize division, we propose a transformative solution that avoids the usual problems of alliance formation and stability. While input-cost complementarity partially mitigates those concerns, a proportional prize-sharing agreement offers a comprehensive remedy, ensuring equitable contributions and gains for the allied parties. The proposed approach not only resolves the alliance-formation puzzle but also enhances the allies’ prospects for success.

Suggested Citation

  • James Boudreau & Shane Sanders, 2025. "Tullock contest alliances with proportional prize-sharing agreements: private collective action mechanisms?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 202(3), pages 367-381, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:202:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01219-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01219-4
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