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Sequential formation of alliances in survival contests

Author

Listed:
  • Hideo Konishi
  • Chen‐Yu Pan

Abstract

We consider a sequential formation of alliances à la Bloch (1996) and Okada (1996), followed by a two‐stage contest in which alliances first compete with each other, and then the members in the winning alliance compete again for an indivisible prize. In contrast to Konishi and Pan (2019a), which adopted an open‐membership game as the alliance formation process, alliances are allowed to limit their memberships (excludable alliances). We show that if members’ efforts are strongly complementary to each other, there will be exactly two asymmetric alliances: the larger alliance is formed first and then the remaining players form the smaller one. This result contrasts with the one under open membership, where moderate complementarity is necessary to support a two‐alliance structure. It is also in stark contrast with Bloch, Sánchez‐Pagés, and Soubeyran (2006), which shows that a grand coalition is formed in the same game if the prize is divisible and a binding contract can be used to avoid further conflicts after an alliance wins the prize.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideo Konishi & Chen‐Yu Pan, 2020. "Sequential formation of alliances in survival contests," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(1), pages 95-105, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:16:y:2020:i:1:p:95-105
    DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12246
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    Cited by:

    1. Imamura, Kenzo & Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu, 2023. "Stability in matching with externalities: Pairs competition and oligopolistic joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 270-286.
    2. James Boudreau & Shane Sanders, 2025. "Tullock contest alliances with proportional prize-sharing agreements: private collective action mechanisms?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 202(3), pages 367-381, March.
    3. Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu, 2021. "Endogenous alliances in survival contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 337-358.
    4. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan & Dimitar Simeonov, 2023. "Formation of Teams in Contests: Tradeoffs Between Inter- and Intra-Team Inequalities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1061, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Apr 2025.
    5. Katsuya Kobayashi, 2024. "Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 483-508, August.
    6. Maria Arbatskaya & Hideo Konishi, 2025. "Disclosing Effort in Dynamic Team Contests With Effort Complementarity," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(5), October.
    7. Dongryul Lee & Pilwon Kim, 2022. "Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 39-68, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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