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Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?

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  • Blouin, Max
  • Pallage, Stéphane

Abstract

We examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid. They hire their troops within a population with varied productivities or skills. We determine the equilibrium distribution of labor in this environment and study how the existence and allocation strategies of a benevolent food aid agency affect this equilibrium. Our model allows us to predict who will be recruited, who will receive aid, and who will die of famine in every circumstance.

Suggested Citation

  • Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2016. "Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-38.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:45:y:2016:i:c:p:18-38
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.09.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
    3. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2008. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 548-565, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Food aid; Civil war; Warlords; Famine;

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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