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Addressing the food aid curse

Author

Listed:
  • Blouin, Max
  • Pallage, Stéphane

Abstract

The food aid curse arises because humanitarian aid agencies that are devoted to save lives cannot commit not to intervene in case of man-made famines. We propose a solution to this curse in models of agrarian economies with kleptocratic governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2009. "Addressing the food aid curse," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 49-51, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:1:p:49-51
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    2. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2008. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 548-565, August.
    3. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
    4. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2006. "Samaritan agents? On the strategic delegation of aid policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 249-263, February.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 162-192, 04/05.
    6. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
    7. Karl Pedersen, 2001. "The Samaritan's Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 693-703, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Alok Kumar, 2014. "Samaritan's Dilemma, Time-Inconsistency and Foreign Aid: A Review of Theoretical Models," Department Discussion Papers 1405, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    3. Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2016. "Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-38.
    4. Alok Kumar, 2014. "Foreign Aid, Incentives and Efficiency: Can Foreign Aid Lead to Efficient Level of Investment?," Department Discussion Papers 1406, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    5. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2008. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 548-565, August.
    6. Hoddinott, John & Margolies, Amy, 2012. "Mapping the Impacts of Food Aid: Current Knowledge and Future Directions," WIDER Working Paper Series 034, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. repec:unu:wpaper:wp2012-34 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:bla:rdevec:v:21:y:2017:i:3:p:678-697 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Food aid Famines Commitment Samaritan's dilemma;

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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