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Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness

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  • Almuth Scholl

    () (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

This paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. Our findings suggest that incentive-compatible conditions substantially promote fiscal reform and investment in the short- and long-run. In contrast to the recent practice of fully canceling multilateral debt, optimal debt relief is characterized by a combination of outright grants and subsidized loans. Losing loans as a policy instrument reduces welfare considerably.

Suggested Citation

  • Almuth Scholl, 2013. "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-23, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  • Handle: RePEc:knz:dpteco:1323
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    File URL: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_23-Scholl_2013.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fink, Fabian & Scholl, Almuth, 2016. "A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 176-190.
    2. Fink, Fabian & Scholl, Almuth, 2016. "A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 176-190.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    neoclassical growth; conditionality; limited enforceable dynamic contracts; foreign aid;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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