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Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals

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  • Philip Bond
  • Hülya Eraslan

Abstract

Prior research on "strategic voting" has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, that is, independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off, even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher. We apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(2), pages 459-490.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:2:p:459-490
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00581.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Thum, Marcel & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018. "Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 28-39.
    2. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
    3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 86-95.
    4. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Andrey Malenko & Ramana Nanda & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & Savitar Sundaresan, 2021. "Catching Outliers: Committee Voting and the Limits of Consensus when Financing Innovation," Harvard Business School Working Papers 21-131, Harvard Business School, revised Nov 2023.
    6. Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2023. "Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation And Obstruction," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(2), pages 757-781, May.
    7. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Yves Breitmoser & Justin Valasek, 2024. "Strategic communication in committees with expressive payoffs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(1), pages 33-54, March.
    9. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(6), pages 2598-2647.
    11. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
    12. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2014. "On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 345-366, December.
    13. Meirowitz, Adam & Pi, Shaoting, 2022. "Voting and trading: The shareholder’s dilemma," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1073-1096.
    14. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2008. "The Option to Wait in Collective Decisions," Working Papers 338, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    15. Henry, Emeric, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
    16. Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    17. Alvaro J. Name-Correa & Huseyin Yildirim, 2018. "A capture theory of committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 135-154, October.
    18. Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Pandering, Faith and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    19. Makoto Hanazono & Yasutora Watanabe, 2018. "Equity bargaining with common value," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 251-292, March.

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