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The informational role of supermajorities

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  • Henry, Emeric

Abstract

We study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically. We show that, consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities. Due to an informational role that we unveil, optimal supermajorities can be less costly than minimum winning coalitions, even though more voters are awarded a positive share. We also examine consequences in terms of quality of decision making. We show that the introduction of a strategic agenda setter can lead to socially suboptimal decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Henry, Emeric, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:10-11:p:2225-2239
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2012. "Informational Benefits of International Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 185-202.

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