Voting in Small Committees
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- Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2014. "Voting in small committees," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 69-95, February.
- Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2012. "Voting in Small Committees," CESifo Working Paper Series 3732, CESifo.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Maria Flavia Ambrosanio & Paolo Balduzzi & Massimo Bordignon, 2015. "Who should review public spending?," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(1), pages 109-127.
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More about this item
Keywords
Voting; Small committees.;JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2011-01-30 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2011-01-30 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-30 (Game Theory)
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