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Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees

  • Alessandro Riboni

    (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal)

  • Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia

    (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal)

This short paper employs individual voting records of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England to study heterogeneity in policy preferences among committee members. The analysis is carried out using a simple generalization of the standard New Keynesian framework that allows members to differ in the weight they give to output compared with inflation stabilization and in their views regarding optimal inflation and natural output. Results indicate that, qualitatively, MPC members are fairly homogeneous in their policy preferences, but there are systematic quantitative differences in their policy reaction functions that are related to the nature of their membership and career background.

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Article provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 213-233

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Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2008:q:1:a:6
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  1. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
  2. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees," Discussion Papers 2006-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  3. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, . "An Optimizing IS-LM Specification for Monetary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis," GSIA Working Papers 1997-71, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  4. Clarida, R. & Gali, J. & Gertler, M., 1998. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and some Theory," Working Papers 98-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  5. Tootell, Geoffrey M. B., 1999. "Whose monetary policy is it anyway?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 217-235, February.
  6. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2007. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," Cahiers de recherche 05-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  7. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees," Discussion Papers 2006-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 861-886.
  9. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
  10. Daniel Seidmann, 2011. "A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 49-74, January.
  11. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
  12. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  13. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 130-38, February.
  14. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2009. "Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(6), pages 1099-1115, 09.
  15. Christopher Spencer, 2006. "The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0306, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
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