Committee Design with Endogenous Information
Identical agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it through voting. Because information is a public good, information is underprovided relative to the social optimum. A "good" voting rule must give incentives to acquire information, as well as aggregate information efficiently. A voting rule that requires a large plurality (in the extreme, unanimity) to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each agent is sufficiently accurate. This result is independent of the preferences of voters and of the cost of information. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.
Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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