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Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments

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  • Eckel, Catherine
  • Holt, Charles A

Abstract

This paper reports results of committee voting experiments with a fixed agenda that specified a sequence of binary decisions. In this particular context, the agenda setter can control the ultimate committee decision if it is known whether voting behavior is myopic or strategic. Subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic voting rules; strategic behavior was more prevalent with experience. The use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

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  • Eckel, Catherine & Holt, Charles A, 1989. "Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 763-773, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:79:y:1989:i:4:p:763-73
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard F. Potthoff, 2014. "Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(4), pages 1-30, October.
    2. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2013. "On the Extent of Strategic Voting," MPRA Paper 50198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello, 2003. "Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 1997-2032, October.
    4. Sujit Chakravorti & Jeffery W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, 2005. "Universal access, cost recovery, and payment services," Working Paper Series WP-05-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
    6. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 1-40.
    7. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    8. A. Rubinstein, 1999. "Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s4, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    9. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Gardner, Roy & von Hagen, Jurgen & Keser, Claudia, 2007. "Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 279-295.
    10. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
    11. Tosun, Mehmet Serkan, 2008. "Endogenous fiscal policy and capital market transmissions in the presence of demographic shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 2031-2060, June.
    12. de Bartolome, Charles A.M., 1991. "Which Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?," Working Papers 91-49, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    13. Lior Davidovitch & Yakov Ben-Haim, 2010. "Robust satisficing voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 265-280, October.
    14. Paolo Balduzzi & Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2014. "Voting in small committees," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 69-95.
    15. Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2009. "Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment," IEW - Working Papers 403, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. de Bartolome, Charles A. M., 1995. "Which tax rate do people use: Average or marginal?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 79-96.
    17. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1999. "Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 155-170, July.
    18. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments : a simulation and laboratory experiment," Papers 07-55, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.

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