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Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information

Author

Listed:
  • Doraszelski Ulrich

    (Hoover Institution)

  • Gerardi Dino

    (Yale University)

  • Squintani Francesco

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players' preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communication is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player's preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender.

Suggested Citation

  • Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:6
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1084
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    2. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    3. Elisabeth Schulte, 2010. "Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
    4. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "The Inferiority of Deliberation Under Unanimity," Discussion Papers 1360, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1411, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Nadya Malenko, 2011. "Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards," 2011 Meeting Papers 449, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Iaryczower, Matias & Lewis, Garrett & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 230-244.
    9. Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July.
    10. Monica Anna Giovanniello, 2017. "Echo Chambers: Voter-to-Voter Communication and Political Competition," 2017 Papers pgi364, Job Market Papers.
    11. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    12. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(2), pages 459-490.
    13. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
    15. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
    16. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    17. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    18. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
    19. Alistair Wilson, 2011. "Costly Communication in Groups: Theory and an Experiment," Working Paper 488, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jul 2012.
    20. Alistair Wilson, 2012. "Costly Communication in Groups: Theory and an Experiment," Working Paper 499, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Feb 2014.
    21. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Viktar Fedaseyeu, 2018. "A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4798-4817, October.
    22. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007.
    23. Taiga Tsubota & Masahide Horita, 2022. "What Forms the Trajectory of Social Reforms? The Roles of Decision Rules and Communication under Epistemic Uncertainty," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 187-212, February.
    24. Torun Dewan & Andrea Galeotti & Christian Ghiglino & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Information aggregation and optimal structure of the executive," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 59632, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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