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Reevaluating Alliance Reliability

Author

Listed:
  • Brett Ashley Leeds
  • Andrew G. Long
  • Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

    (Department of Political Science, Florida State University)

Abstract

Previously reported empirical evidence suggests that when conflict arises, military alliances are not reliable; state leaders should only expect their alliance partners to join them in war about 25% of the time. Yet, theoretical arguments explaining the choices of leaders to form cooperative agreements are at odds with such empirical evidence. This puzzling gap between theory and evidence motivates a reconsideration of previous measures of alliance reliability. Many alliance treaties include specific language regarding the circumstances under which the alliance comes into effect, often limiting obligations to disputes with specific target states or in specific geographic areas, and many treaties do not go so far as to require states to join in active fighting. Considering the specific obligations included in alliance agreements provides an improved estimate of the propensity of states to honor their commitments. Results show that alliances are reliable 74.5% of the time.

Suggested Citation

  • Brett Ashley Leeds & Andrew G. Long & Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, 2000. "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(5), pages 686-699, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:5:p:686-699
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044005006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 379-406, July.
    2. James D. Fearon, 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 68-90, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Jesse C. Johnson & Brett Ashley Leeds & Ahra Wu, 2015. "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 309-336, March.

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