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Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Elbittar

    (alexander.elbittar@cide.edu)

  • Andrei Gomberg

    (gomberg@itam.mx)

  • Laura Sour

    (laura.sour@cide.edu)

Abstract

Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We conduct a laboratory study of the effect of different voting procedures on group decision-making in the context of ultimatum bargaining. Earlier studies have suggested that when the bargaining game is played by unstructured groups of agents, rather than by individuals, the division of the payoff is substantially affected in favor of the ultimatum-proposers. Our theoretical arguments suggest that one explanation for this could be implicit voting rules within groups. We explicitly structure the group decision-making as voting and study the impact of different voting rules on the bargaining outcome. The observed responder behavior is consistent with preferences depending solely on payoff distribution. Furthermore, we observe that proposers react in an expected manner to changes in voting rule in the responder group.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2005. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0511002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0511002 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Battaglini & Lydia Mechtenberg, 2014. "When do conflicting parties share political power? An experimental study," Working Papers 057-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    2. Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2005. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0511002, EconWPA.
    3. Elbittar Alexander & Gomberg Andrei & Sour Laura, 2011. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, pages 1-33.
    4. Kugler, Tamar & Kausel, E.E. & Kocher, Martin G., 2012. "Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups," Munich Reprints in Economics 18215, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    6. Christoph March & Robert K. von Weizsäcker, 2016. "Coordinating Intergenerational Redistribution and the Repayment of Public Debt," CESifo Working Paper Series 6075, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), 2013. "Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12964, September.
    8. Stephan Kroll & John A. List & Charles F. Mason, 2013. "The prisoner’s dilemma as intergroup game: an experimental investigation," Chapters,in: Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment, chapter 16, pages 458-481 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining games; group decision making and experimental design.;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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