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A group bargaining solution

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  • Chae, Suchan
  • Heidhues, Paul

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  • Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "A group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-53, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:37-53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-851, November.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    5. Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-497, June.
    6. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 1999. "Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-01, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    7. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
    8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    10. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-273, June.
    11. Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May.
    12. Byoung Heon Jun, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76.
    13. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
    14. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
    2. Suchan Chae & Hervé Moulin, 2010. "Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 71-88, March.
    3. Antoine Soubeyran & Hubert Stahn, 2007. "Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good Industries?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 119-135, June.
    4. Zhang, Xiaodong, 2009. "A note on the group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 155-160, March.
    5. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012. "The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.
    6. Elbittar Alexander & Gomberg Andrei & Sour Laura, 2011. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-33, August.
    7. Gustavo Bergantiños & Balbina Casas- Méndez & Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure," Game Theory and Information 0511006, EconWPA.
    8. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    9. Bergantinos, G. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007. "A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 35-58, July.
    10. María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2014. "Bargaining and membership," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 800-814, July.
    11. Barros, Pedro Pita & Martinez-Giralt, Xavier, 2008. "Selecting health care providers: "Any willing provider" vs. negotiation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 402-414, June.
    12. ., 2012. "Models of Negotiation and Bargaining in Health Care," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 21 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Negotiating the membership," Game Theory and Information 0409003, EconWPA.
    14. Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Tangsangasaksri, Supanit, 2011. "Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 55-64, July.

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