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Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint

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  • Chae, Suchan

    (Rice U)

  • Moulin, Herve

Abstract

We introduce a model of bargaining among groups, and characterize a family of solutions using a Consistency axiom and a few other invariance and monotonicity properties. For each solution in the family, there exists some constant alpha >= 0 such that the "bargaining power" of a group is proportional to calpha where c is the cardinality of the group.

Suggested Citation

  • Chae, Suchan & Moulin, Herve, 2004. "Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint," Working Papers 2004-01, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2004-01
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    File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2004papers/barggroups4.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Haruo Imai & Naoki Watanabe, 2005. "On The Neutrality Of Coalition Formation In A Pure Bargaining Problem," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 352-362, September.
    2. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2008. "Bargaining in Committees of Representatives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 93-106, January.
    3. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012. "The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.
    4. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007.
    5. Gustavo Bergantiños & Balbina Casas- Méndez & Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure," Game Theory and Information 0511006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Bergantinos, G. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007. "A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 35-58, July.
    8. María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2014. "Bargaining and membership," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 800-814, July.
    9. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Vollstädt, Ulrike, 2014. "Bilateral bargaining of heterogeneous groups—How significant are patient partners?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 433-441.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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