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A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure


  • Gustavo Bergantiños

    (Universidade de Vigo)

  • Balbina Casas- Méndez

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro

    (Universidade de Vigo)

  • Juan Vidal-Puga

    (Universidade de Vigo)


In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustavo Bergantiños & Balbina Casas- Méndez & Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure," Game Theory and Information 0511006, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511006
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(3), pages 679-701, April.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Borm, Peter & Keiding, H & McLean, R.P. & Oortwijn, S & Tijs, S, 1992. "The Compromise Value for NTU-Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(2), pages 175-189.
    4. Krasa, Stefan & Temimi, Akram & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2003. "Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 51-62, February.
    5. Hart, Sergiu, 1985. "An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1295-1313, November.
    6. Suchan Chae & Hervé Moulin, 2010. "Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 71-88, March.
    7. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012. "The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.
    8. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
    9. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 1985. "Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 307-327, March.
    10. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "The NTU consistent coalitional value," Game Theory and Information 0303007, EconWPA.
    11. Winter, Eyal, 1991. "On Non-transferable Utility Games with Coalition Structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(1), pages 53-63.
    12. Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "A group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-53, July.
    13. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
    14. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    15. Geoffroy de Clippel & Hans Peters & Horst Zank, 2004. "Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
    2. María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2014. "Bargaining and membership," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 800-814, July.

    More about this item


    coalition structure bargaining values;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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