IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpga/0405004.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Single NTU-value solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Emililo Calvo

    (Dep. of Economic Analysis. University of Valencia)

Abstract

We propose a variation of the Hart and Mas-Colell non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person games in coalitional form. This strategic game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games. This value coincides with the Maschler and Owen value for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games. The main characteristic of this proposal is that always select a unique payoff allocation. This value can also be considered as an extension of the Nash bargaining solution. Variations of this model yield extensions of the Discrete Raiffa solution, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Emililo Calvo, 2004. "Single NTU-value solutions," Game Theory and Information 0405004, EconWPA, revised 10 Jun 2004.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405004 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/0405/0405004.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038, March.
    4. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
    5. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    6. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 255-273, March.
    7. Sjostrom, Tomas, 1991. "Stahl's bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 153-157, June.
    8. Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999. "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-228, May.
    9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    10. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Roth, Alvin E., 1977. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-251, December.
    12. Hart, Sergiu, 1985. "An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1295-1313, November.
    13. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
    14. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
    15. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    16. Sergiu Hart, 2005. "An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 355-366, September.
    17. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. Emilio Calvo & Iñaki Garci´a & José M. Zarzuelo, 2001. "Replication invariance on NTU games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 473-486.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shapley value; NTU-value solutions; Nash Bargaining; Raiffa solution; Kali-Smorodinsky solution.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.