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An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Michela Chessa

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Aymeric Lardon

  • Takashi Yamada

Abstract

In this experiment, we compare three implementations of the Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a two-period implementation with low delay costs, and a two-period implementation with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different implementations result in similar outcomes in all our investigation domains: namely, coalition formation, alignment with the Shapley value prediction, and satisfaction of the axioms. Our results suggest that a lighter bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as an appropriate cooperative solution concept, while saving unnecessary time and resource costs.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," Post-Print hal-03907381, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03907381
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00463-x
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    1. repec:nad:wpaper:20220080 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2023. "An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 88-104.
    3. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "Cost of complexity in implementing the Shapley value by choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure," ISER Discussion Paper 1176, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    4. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2025. "An experimental Nash program: A comparison of structured versus semi-structured bargaining experiments," Post-Print hal-05441314, HAL.
    5. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2022. "The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    6. Baranski, Andrzej & Haas, Nicholas, 2023. "The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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