IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v190y2008i3p659-671.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value

Author

Listed:
  • Vidal-Puga, Juan J.

Abstract

A simple protocol for coalition formation is presented. First, an order of the players is randomly chosen. Then, a coalition grows by sequentially incorporating new members in this order. The protocol is studied in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. If (weighted) utility transfers are feasible when everybody cooperates, then the expected subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation anticipated before any implemented game is the Shapley NTU value.

Suggested Citation

  • Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2008. "Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 190(3), pages 659-671, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:190:y:2008:i:3:p:659-671
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377-2217(07)00650-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
    2. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "A comparison of non-transferable utility values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 35-46, February.
    3. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    4. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    6. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(2), pages 207-228, August.
    8. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Walter Trockel, 2002. "A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 581-586.
    10. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
    11. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
    12. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
    13. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    14. Harsanyi, John C, 1980. "Comments on Roth's Paper, "Values for Games without Side Payments"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 477-477, March.
    15. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    16. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
    17. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Winter, Eyal, 1999. "Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 72-94, July.
    18. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.
    19. Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
    20. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
    21. Roth, Alvin E, 1980. "Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 457-465, March.
    22. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
    23. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    24. Shafer, Wayne J, 1980. "On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 466-476, March.
    25. Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg, 1999. "A note on van Damme's mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 179-187.
    26. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
    27. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    28. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francis Bloch & Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2011. "Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 263-280, May.
    2. Drouvelis, Michalis & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2010. "Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 274-292, July.
    3. Flesch, J. & Kuipers, J. & Schoenmakers, G. & Vrieze, K., 2013. "Subgame-perfection in free transition games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 201-207.
    4. Zaporozhets, Vera & García-Valiñas, María & Kurz, Sascha, 2016. "Key drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 57-70.
    5. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 2007-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaı¨t, Tarik, 2013. "Absolute optimal solution for a compact and convex game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 353-361.
    7. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Cornelia, 2011. "Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: Two sides of one coin," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 604-615, December.
    8. Vera Zaporozhets & Mar'ia Garc'ia-Vali~nas & Sascha Kurz, 2015. "Key drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter?," Papers 1512.01267, arXiv.org.
    9. Audy, Jean-François & D’Amours, Sophie & Rönnqvist, Mikael, 2012. "An empirical study on coalition formation and cost/savings allocation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 13-27.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:190:y:2008:i:3:p:659-671. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.