The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and find empirical support for the paradox.
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|Date of creation:||Sep 2007|
|Date of revision:|
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- Maria Montero, 2007.
"The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach,"
2007-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Maria Montero, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach," Discussion Papers 2007-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2005.
"Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study,"
2005-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2008. "Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 69-87, January.
- Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2005. "Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0507001, EconWPA.
- Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2005. "Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 2005-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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"Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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"Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers,"
122247000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
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- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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"Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
99-044/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2005. "Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 278-311, February.
- Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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