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An empirical study on coalition formation and cost/savings allocation

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  • Audy, Jean-François
  • D’Amours, Sophie
  • Rönnqvist, Mikael

Abstract

Interest has been raised by the recent identification of potential savings through collaborative planning in logistics operations. Even though substantial savings can be realized, two key questions exist: (i) how should potential savings be divided among a group of collaborating companies and (ii) among potential collaborating companies, how should collaborating group(s) be formed? These two questions are studied in a specific context: among potential collaborating companies; a subset, denoted the leading companies, performs collaborative planning on behalf of the others and together, they initiate formation of a collaborating group. We use the concept of a business model to detail such context. Based on the literature on network formation where potential savings are modelled by a cooperative game, four business models are explored in four different subsets of leading companies. We propose a network model as a method to determine the stable collaborating group in each computation. A case study including eight forest companies is described and analyzed. Results show that very different solution characteristics can be achieved depending on the business model selected.

Suggested Citation

  • Audy, Jean-François & D’Amours, Sophie & Rönnqvist, Mikael, 2012. "An empirical study on coalition formation and cost/savings allocation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 13-27.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:136:y:2012:i:1:p:13-27
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.08.027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Guajardo & Kurt Jörnsten & Mikael Rönnqvist, 2016. "Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(1), pages 25-50, January.
    2. Kimms, A. & Kozeletskyi, I., 2016. "Core-based cost allocation in the cooperative traveling salesman problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(3), pages 910-916.
    3. Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. & Tirupati, Devanath & Chandra, Pankaj, 2013. "Stability issues in supply chain networks: Implications for coordination mechanisms," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 179-193.
    4. Ben Jouida, Sihem & Krichen, Saoussen & Klibi, Walid, 2017. "Coalition-formation problem for sourcing contract design in supply networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(2), pages 539-558.
    5. Xiaozhou Xu & Shenle Pan & Eric Ballot, 2013. "A sharing mechanism for superadditive and non-superadditive logistics cooperation," Post-Print halshs-00876006, HAL.

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