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Networks with Group Counterproposals

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  • Nieva, Ricardo

Abstract

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Nieva, Ricardo, 2008. "Networks with Group Counterproposals," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 42901, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemct:42901
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.42901
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    2. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
    3. Gabrielle Demange & Wooders Myrna, 2005. "Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions," Post-Print halshs-00576778, HAL.
    4. Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "original papers : Network formation with sequential demands," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(3), pages 229-249.
    5. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
    6. Demange,Gabrielle & Wooders,Myrna (ed.), 2005. "Group Formation in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842716, January.
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    1. Nieva, Ricardo, "undated". "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 206838, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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