A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers
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References listed on IDEAS
- D. Samet, 1987. "Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree," Discussion Papers 749, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1993.
"Custom versus fashion: path-dependence and limit cycles in a random matching game,"
Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics
82, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Zvika Neeman, 1993. "A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs," Discussion Papers 1029, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 170-190.
- Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 190-207.
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